We study empirically the dynamic properties of covered interest rate parity (CIRP) classified under the two broad groupings of emerging market currencies versus the currencies of advanced economies countries.
Introduction
in both developed and emerging swap markets, coinciding with the fact that LOP more or less holds during these periods. Our second main finding is concerned with the volatility spillover between the short-and longterm markets. Information transmission also varies considerably in developed and emerging swap markets. First of all, there exists no volatility spillover in both economies before the outbreak of the financial distress. During the crisis phase, however, developed markets consistently display a one-way spillover movement (from short-to long-term funding), while emerging markets tend to display two-way movements. This implies that the general argument in support of the "short-to long-term transmission"is not necessarily the norm across markets. More importantly, while the spillover effects tend to persist in developed countries even during the post-crisis period, no such transmission is observed in emerging countries. This suggests that the memory of funding constraints is retained in developed swap markets, but not in their emerging equivalents. This also indicates to a certain segmentation among developed and emerging economies. Our findings also suggest that there exists a dynamic correlation between short-and long-term deviations, but no correlated-information channel (i.e. price discovery) between these corresponding deviations. Our final result supports the argument that the compression of CIRP deviations coincides with the FED stress test announcements. This implies that FED's actions undertaken during the liquidity phase were mainly ineffective, and that the later interventions were more successful in relieving the market frictions in the fx swap markets. The underlying message here is that funding markets are responsive to governmental programs that target the "uncertainty"risk in financial markets.
The remainder of this paper is as follows. Section 2 gives the literature review. Section 3 gives the theoretical framework of CIRP equilibrium via FX swap markets and cross currency basis swap markets. Section 4 details the data description and Section 5 discusses the potential determinants of CIRP deviations. We follow Meng et al. (2009) who suggest co-movement is defined as the contemporaneous shocks transmitted between assets. Spillover is defined as the lagged shocks transmitted between assets. In this context, Baba (2009) integrates the concepts of FX swaps and cross currency basis swaps to explain short-and long-term CIRP, respectively, and investigates the dynamic spillover effects from short-to long-term markets for the EUR-USD pair.
Theoretical Framework
This paper studies the short-and long-term covered interest rate parity (CIRP) deviations in swap markets of developed and emerging countries. First we present the classical equation of the CIRP and its implications as a no-arbitrage condition. Then we derive the short-term CIRP via FX swap and long-term CIRP via cross currency basis swap markets. We also show that, these two swaps should be in a no-arbitrage relationship by allowing for differential risk premiums.
FX Swap Markets: Short Term CIRP
FX swaps are transactions in which one party borrows in one currency, and simultaneously lends in another, with an agreed forward level. It is mainly used by corporates to hedge their curreny exposure and by banks for banks for funding foreign currencies, both for their own and their customers, including exporters and importers. FX swaps have also been used as a tool for speculative trading. FX swaps require the exchange of the notional amounts at the beginning of the contract and the most liquid term is shorter than one year. Covered interest rate parity (CIRP) is a no-arbitrage condition, which states that the spread between two risk-free securities under two different currencies is zero. In other words, the return of lending one unit of local currency must be equal to first converting it to foreign currency in the spot market, then lending it in foreign rate, and finally converting it back to local currency with an agreed forward rate in the maturity.
3 Given:
S: is the prevailing spot exchange rate of foreign currencies per unit of a dollar.
r: is T year USD interest rate.
3 It must be noted that this condition holds under the assumptions that there is perfect financial mobility without capital controls, and transaction costs and default risks are negligible. r: is T year foreign interest rate. F: is the forward exchange rate of foreign currencies per unit of a dollar for T years Then the CIRP condition is expressed as follows:
Hence, any deviation from the classical CIRP condition, which we denote as Law of One Price (LOP) deviation, may be shown as follows:
In normal circumstances, a deviation from the CIRP represents a potential arbitrage opportunity and when arbitragers exploit this advantage, they eventually drive the deviations back to zero. However, arbitrage opportunities can be subject to various economic constraints, preventing arbitrageurs to take advantage and push the prices back to an arbitrage-free equilibrium. One major arbitrage impediment is illiquidity, and therefore, deviations generated by taking bid and ask spreads into account should be analyzed. Thus similar to Fong et al. (2010) we extend the CIRP condition to be robust to considerations of transactions costs 4 . We incorporate the bid-ask spread for the four legs of the arbitrage transaction: forward swap, spot rate, dollar interest rate and the foreign interest rates to the condition given in Eq(1).
Then, denoting the short-term deviation proxy as SD, we calculate:
According to the short term CIRP, the SD should be zero. In normal circumstances, an any deviation from CIRP represents a potential arbitrage opportunity and arbitragers are expected to take this advantage and eventually drive the deviation back to zero. A positive deviation implies lower demand for USD. The intuition lies in the fact that it becomes cheaper to borrow in the foreign risk-free rate than in usd. 5 
Cross Currency Basis Swap Markets: Long Term CIRP
Cross currency basis swaps, ranging from 1 to 30 years, are transactions in which an institution borrows in one currency and simultaneously lends in another. Essentially, the agreement is an exchange of two floating-rate notes denominated in separate currencies. 6 Historically, liquidity of the long-term FX swap market had been very low, compared with the cross-currency swap market, and hence most of the studies have used only the cross-currency swap prices to test the long-term covered interest parity. As discussed in Tuckman and Porfirio (2003) , cross currency basis swaps are commonly quoted as USD Libor against the foreign currency with a positive or negative spread. More specifically, when the credit risk in foreign Libor rates is greater (or less) than its equivalent in USD Libor rates, the cross currency basis swap should be negative (or positive). Therefore, cross currency basis swaps represent the difference between the credit risks in the Libor rates of two different currencies. This credit risk premium, or shortly basis, is related closely to the credit quality of the benchmark rate. In this context, since USD Libor rate has a better credit quality than the emerging market interbank rate, the USD borrower should accept the deduction of basis from the interest he receives. Therefore, the basis stands for the credit risk premium that the riskier counterparty must endure. 7 This implies that the given swap transactions tend to represent the relative attractiveness of financing in one currency rather than the other one. Cross currency basis swaps are mainly used as a hedging tool by developed markets and used as a raising capital to emerging markets by effectively switching funding from hard currency to local currency at the current spot FX rate, and hence, benefiting from negative basis. 8 Cross currency basis swaps are also used for minimizing the currency mismatches and exposures. Similarly for long term deviations from CIRP, we use the cross currency basis swap markets. The crosscurrency swap markets are considerably more liquid than the long term FX swap markets, both in developed and emerging countries. Similar to the theoretical setting of Tuckman and Porfirio (2003) , CIRP deviation in the long term can be described as follows
where PV(X) is the represent present value of cross currency basis. Hence, we can claim that long term deviation (LD) from CIRP is:
According to the long term CIRP, the LD should be zero. Direct link between SD and LD should be noticed from Eq. (3) that CIRP equality no longer holds if the assumption of PV(X)=0 is violated. Eq. (2) and Eq. (4) shows us that both LD and SD are driven by the similar market dynamics, both representing real arbitrage situations in case the equality does not hold. Therefore, in equilibrium, the short-and long-term swap agreements may differ significantly depending on their response to various exogenous shocks that may pull prices away from the fundamentals. Not only may SD and LD differ among each other considerably in terms of deviations, but they may also differ across time. For this reason, we aim to find the link between the anomalies of SD and LD by splitting the sample period into three main subsets: Pre-crisis, crisis, and post-crisis periods, each presumably affected by different levels of market risk aversion.
Data Description
This paper examines the violations of CIRP for six currencies, classified under two broad groupings of three emerging market currencies (Turkey, Mexico and South Africa) versus three developed market currencies (Euro, United Kingdom and Japan). The classification of emerging market economies is based on the IMF Country Grouping Classification, where the given emerging markets are the only ones with sufficient depth in 7 Flavell (2002) argues that the level of the basis spread also depends on the supply and demand dynamics of currencies. 8 To understand the dynamics behind the different scheme of funding in emerging markets, we can investigate their usage. First, we need to decompose the spreads, and try to comprehend the fundamentals behind it. One part of the basis spread is the cross currency swap, which, in Turkey for instance, is generally used as a source of funding for mortgages via lending USD and collecting Turkish Lira (TL). High levels of foreign currencies in local banks, held as deposits by local owners, motivate the banks to seek other ways to create funding. However, the Lehman-related turbulence in the financial sector, and the sharply decreasing global investor risk-appetite, triggered investors in Turkey to unwind their once-opened cross currency swap trades. It suppressed the basis further to -300 bps, given that the basis was around -100 bps before the Lehman bankruptcy. 9 As discussed in Popper (1993) and Baba (2009) , another way to write the long-term CIRP condition for the cross currency swap markets is: (1 + r) T = (1 + r) T + [(1 + r) T − ((1 + r) T + LD)], where LD = 0 must hold for the long-term CIRP to hold. In other words, LD represents the long-term deviation from the CIRP condition observable in the cross currency basis swap market.
short-term and long-term swap and FX option markets during the given time interval.
10 Table 1 displays the currency codes used throughout the paper.
The data set for spot, forward and interest rates data are retrieved from Bloomberg. FX options and cross currency basis data covering the period November 2006 -March 2010, is based on the data set provided by BNP Paribas. The entire sample is divided into three subsamples: pre-crisis, crisis and post-crisis. The entire crisis period is defined in accordance with Taylor and Williams (2009) The short-term CIRP deviations (i.e. 3-months) are based on Eq. (4) and are denoted as SD. The longterm deviations are directly captured by the 1-year cross currency basis swap spreads, (in other words, the basis), and are denoted as LD. Table 2 and Table 3 display the average deviations (SD and LD) and top quartiles with respect to each currency and each subsample. Table 2 displays the summary statistics regarding the mean and top quartiles of the CIRP deviations in developed markets. First of all, the absolute average short-and long-term deviations in pre-crisis range between 1 to 8 bps for short-term and 0 to 2 bps for long-term deviations. Similarly, this period displays low volatility levels of 2 to 6 bps for short-term and less than 1 bps for the long-term. This implies that the CIRP condition holds empirically, and enforces zero arbitrage.
12 Nevertheless, deviations tend to become large, volatile and persistent during the market turmoil. The first moment in liquidity crisis ranges between 17 to 30 bps in short-term, and 6 to 12 bps for long-term, indicating that neither short-nor long-term CIRP holds empirically. In credit crisis, the deviations attain their maximum levels, ranging between 30 to 90 bps in short-term and 32 to 55 in long-term. It is observed that the given first moments can be more than twentyfive times than their pre-crisis values. 13 Note that GBP-based transactions display the highest short-term deviations, and the EUR-based transactions display the highest long-term deviations. In accordance with McCauley and McGuire (2009), this finding validates the high USD demand coming from European financial 10 The reason why Russia and Brazil are excluded is because their currencies are not convertible in international markets. Moreover, we leave out Asian currencies as many of them have fixed or pegged exchange-rate regimes.
11 In August 9, BNP Paribas announced that it was unable to determine the net asset values for three of its credit-focused hedge funds, and would suspend withdrawals from those funds (see Boyd, 2007) . 12 The low non-zero levels could result from additional trading costs (i.e. brokerage fees, settlement costs) as investigated by Fong et al. (2010) . 13 Likewise, the volatilities range between 35 to 41 bps for short-term, and 16 to 27 bps for long-term during the entire crisis period.
institutions that were able to fund themselves (before crisis) via relatively cheap USD. On the other hand, Japan suffers least from the disequilibrium. As pointed out by BIS (2010), this is partly due to Japanese banks having accumulated over time a considerable amount of liquid net foreign positions in usd (i.e. US government bonds). It is also related to the fact that Japanese banks were less dependent on short-term interbank borrowings to raise usd funds. Finally, the first moment of deviations tend to decrease slightly (and monotonically) in the post-crisis phase, but the convergence towards the pre-crisis is far from being complete. The new averages range between 22 to 30 bps for short-term, and 23 to 27 for long-term. In other words, first moments are similar to those in the liquidity crisis, indicating that the memory of crisis is still retained in the market. Table 3 displays the summary statistics regarding the mean and top quartiles of CIRP deviations in emerging markets. First of all, the deviations are often larger and more volatile than they are in the developed markets. However, the general conclusion is the same. The first moments and top quartiles of the deviations tend to increase monotonically from pre-crisis to crisis period. In the pre-crisis, the absolute average shortand long-term deviations range between 21 to 63 bps for short-term and 23 to 70 bps for long-term deviations.
In this period, notice that Mexico has lower first moments compared to Turkey. As pointed out in BIS (2010), this partly related to the fact that the foreign-owned banks in Mexico did not hold many non-peso assets, but instead relied on local funding. The picture becomes very severe during the market turmoil. While the first moments during the liquidity phase range between 37 to 38 bps and 24 to 100 bps for short-and long-term deviations respectively, they increase up to 44 to 170 bps and 35 to 229 bps, respectively, during the credit crisis period. This indicates to a serious level of anomaly in the swap markets.
14 The improvement in the swap markets is evidenced by the narrowing of deviations starting in late 2008, though the moments are often greater than in the pre-crisis phase.
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The law of one price holds in the absence of transaction frictions, often represented as the bid-ask spreads.
Recent literature emphasizes instances when CIRP deviations exceed the transaction cost band (see Peel and Taylor, 2002; Akram et al., 2008) . Our work is built on the similar observation that the LOP violations were so great during market turmoil that even the increasing transaction costs failed to explain the reason why arbitrage opportunities were not exploited. Therefore, in order to see how large and volatile the deviations are, we also run a comparative analysis by taking into account the bid ask values of the corresponding spot, forward and Libor, and the bid ask spreads of cross currency basis swaps, which are all expected to widen during unstable periods due to the heightened illiquidity concerns and uncertainty. We find that although the bid-ask spreads indeed widen during the crisis, the increase in the deviations far outstrips the bid-ask spread bounds (see Figure 9 ). As displayed in Tables 2 and 3 , the differential between the absolute deviations and bid-ask spreads attains its maximum during the credit crisis periods. This suggests that even in the absence of bid-ask spread costs, arbitrageurs are still limited severely in their ability to take the risk-free positions.
This leads us to the next section, which investigates the potential market constraints behind this anomaly. 
Theoretical Determinants of CIRP Deviations

Global Factors
Global Liquidity Factor :
• Repo Specialness: Repo markets play an essential role on the balance sheet adjustments of intermediaries (see Adrian and Shin, 2010) . As a related literature, Fontaine and Garcia (2009) propose a new liquidity measure that captures the global bond market liquidity via the repo specialness of US Treasury on-therun bonds, which is expected to share a common component with the risk premia in other markets (i.e. swap transactions). We use the Fontaine and Garcia (2009) measure as a proxy of liquidity, labeling it as FG-Liq.
Global Funding Factors:
• Funding Factors: In the pre-crisis period, both the unsecured and secured markets were key sources of funding. Brunnermeier and Pedersen (2009) argue that investment banks and hedge funds are the two major traders of arbitrage participating actively in either of these markets. Investment banks mostly operate in unsecured markets, and hedge funds in secured markets (via borrowing/lending secured collaterals). As pointed out by Kacperczyk and Schnabl (2010) , commercial paper issuance has also become a key source of cheap funding at short-term interest rates. Access to funding depends not only on the level of firm capitalization, but also on the tightness of markets. In the beginning of the 2007 crisis, for instance, the funding markets saw unprecedented disruptions, originating from US dollar funding markets. Based on this, we divide the funding factors into three main components: (i) Unsecured
Funding; (ii) Secured Funding; (iii) Commercial Paper Issuance.
-Unsecured Funding: The Unsecured funding cost is the differential between 3-month Libor and 3-month US Overnight Index Swap (OIS) rates, capturing the willingness of the financial institutions to engage in intrabank lending. As Goldberg et. al (2010) point out, it also represents the relative cost of US dollar funding through private markets versus official liquidity facilities. We denote this proxy as UNSECURED. Figures 2-5 suggest that its average and volatility tend to increase from pre-crisis to credit crisis, displaying a 44% and -43% correlation with the first principal components of short-and long-term deviations, respectively, during the latter period, in emerging markets;
and 59% and 49%, respectively, in developed markets. The differential narrows during the postcrisis, though still with higher volatility and correlation values compared to the pre-crisis period, suggesting a lasting risk perception in unsecured market transactions. Notice that the correlation values in emerging economies are always lower than those in developed economies. The long-term deviations are negatively correlated with UNSECURED in the former economy.
-Secured Funding: As suggested by BIS (2010), anomalies in funding operations occured first in the unsecured markets, then moved to their secured equivalents. Due to magnifying concerns about the growing volatility of collaterals and their heightened credit/liquidity risks, funding via repo markets became increasingly difficult. We define the Secured Funding as the differential between US Treasury repo rates and US Agency Mortgage-Backed Security (MBS) rates, capturing the highquality vs. low-quality collaterals. The short-term secured funding uses 3-month rates, and longterm secured funding risk uses 1-year rates. This may also be regarded as a proxy for the tightness of margin requirements (see Sarkar and Shrader, 2010) . The risk premium related to collateral value increases with the widening of MBS spreads, influencing leveraged risky-arbitrage positions (see Gabaix et al., 2007) . We denote this proxy as SECURED. Figure Figures 2-5 also reveal that the average and volatility of SECURED increase from pre-crisis to credit crisis. During the latter period, the correlation with the first principal components of short-and long-term deviations are 21% and -43%, respectively, in emerging markets; and 61% and 52%, respectively, in developed markets. Notice again that the correlation values in emerging economies are always lower. Moreover, the long-term deviations are again negatively correlated with SECURED in the former economy.
-Commercial Paper Issuance: Commercial papers of major financial institutions are often regarded as high-quality safe assets. Although this was true before crisis, the market perception changed during the market turmoil. Figures 2-5 show that there is a dramatic fall in commercial paper issuances during the last quarter of 2008 and the first quarter of 2009, a period when the correlation with the first principal components of short-and long-term deviations became -25% and -48%, respectively, in emerging markets; and 12% and -9%, respectively, in developed markets. We denote this proxy as CP. Notice that the correlation values in both emerging and developed economies are not as high as expected. While there is a negative CP correlation in both short-and longterm deviations of emerging economies, a weak positive correlation is observed in the short-term deviations of developed economies.
Global Macro Factors:
• Term Premia: As a proxy for macroeconomic activity, the slope of US term structure should be highly informative (see Diebold and Li, 2006) . In this context, Vayanos and Vila (2009) discuss a theoretical model in which arbitrageurs move along the term structure, and take advantage of demand shocks via shorting or longing specific bonds. Based on this argument, the slope of the yield curve carries relevant information about the relative cost of funding through risky arbitrage. We define the US slope as the differential between 10 year Treasury bonds and 3 month Libor yields. We label term premia as TP.
• Macro-Activity Risk: Ludvigson and Ng (2009) argue that macroeconomic activities have high predictive power on excess bond returns. 16 Their procedure of cross-sectional averaging helps to smooth out temporal instabilities of individual series, capturing better the features related to marginal utilities driven by a large panel of economic fundamentals. In order to distinguish better the macro-activity risks from other risk factors, we generate a similar variable by excluding price-based information from the panel. We label this factor as LN-Macro. The relevance of this factor to our study is that the worsening macroeconomic conditions can create severe financial constraints, affecting the law of one price.
• Equity Risk Premium Factor: Campbell and Cochrane (1999) find evidence for asset price predictability via a model of time-varying risk aversion. Bansal and Yaron (2005) attribute the majority of this predictability on persistent cash-flow channel. Nevertheless, both works indicate that dividend yields rise in times of distress. As a related literature in limits to arbitrage, Garleanu and Pedersen (2010) use dividend yields to proxy for the states of the world in which the law of one price is violated. We also use the S&P500 dividend yield to control for these states, labeling it as DIVY. Indeed, based on Figures 2-5, DIVY increases in the crisis period, and begins to decline only in the post-crisis period. During the credit crisis, the correlation of DIVY with the first principal components of short-and long-term deviations are 58% and 62%, respectively, in emerging markets; and 11% and 41%, respectively, in developed markets.
Notice that both the short-and long-term deviations in emerging economies are more correlated with DIVY compared to their equivalents in developed economies. 
Global Sentiment Factors
US Emerging Market debt funds (EDD, TEI, ESD and MSD)
. 17 We name this proxy CLOSED-END.
Figures 2-5 reveal that CLOSED-END reaches it lowest point of 0.61 during the November 2008, having a correlation of -40% and 3% with the first principal components of short-and long-term deviations, respectively, in emerging markets; and -53% and -75%, respectively, in developed markets. Notice that the emerging market deviations are less correlated with CLOSED-END compared to developed market deviations. Moreover, in emerging economies, the short-term deviations have higher correlation values than their long-term equivalents.
• Perceived Tail Event Risk: Market practitioners use option-implied market volatility (i.e. VIX) as a proxy of fear in US markets. 18 This is analogous to the market perception of the cost of insurance against tail event risk (see Pan and Singleton, 2008) . We use both the first difference of VIX and the 16 By dynamic factor analysis they estimate a set of common factors from a panel of 132 real, nominal, and monetary measures of economic activity.
17 EDD, with a market cap of 1189 million usd, is Morgan Stanley Emerging Markets. TEI, with a market cap of 772 million usd, is Templeton Emerging Markets Income Fund. ESD, with a market cap of 580 million usd, is Legg Mason Partners Income Trust -Western Asset Emerging Markets Debt Portfolio. MSD, with a market cap of 235 million usd, is Morgan Stanley Emerging Markets Debt Fund Inc. Closed-end fund discounts are generated by dividing the corresponding market prices of to NAVs.
18 VIX is the weighted blend of implied volatilities of 1-month options written on S&P500 index.
square of first-difference VIX to capture the linear and non-linear effects, respectively. We label the former as VIX, the latter as VIX2. Figures 2-5 suggest that the level and volatility of VIX peaks during the credit crisis, having a correlation of 76% and 5% with the first principal components of short-and long-term deviations, respectively, in emerging markets; and 49% and 60%, respectively, in developed markets. Notice that the short-term deviations in emerging markets are more correlated with VIX compared to those in developed markets. Nevertheless, the long-term deviations tend to have almost zero VIX correlation in emerging economies as opposed to developed economies.
Global Uncertainty Factors
• Subjective Uncertainty Factors: Uncertainty threatens the formation of rational expectations in financial markets, causing unattractive arbitrage positions. Knight (1921) Bloom, 2009 ). As a proxy for disagreement in beliefs, we implement directly the subjective uncertainty measure constructed by Buraschi and Jiltsov (2006) . 19 The disagreement in beliefs proxy is labeled as DiB.
Regional Factors
Equity Market Risk : To measure the impact of equity indices on deviations, we control for two factors: (i) S&P500 Index for developed countries; (ii) MSCI Emerging Market index only for emerging countries. 20 We label the former proxy as SP500 and the latter as EM-MSCI.
Credit Market Risk : To measure the impact of credit default swaps (CDSs) on deviations, we employ two factors: (i) Markit CDX North American Investment Grade Index for developed countries; 21 (ii) Markit CDX Emerging Markets Index for emerging countries. 22 We label the former proxy as US-CDX, and the latter as EM-CDX.
Currency Market Risk : The tightness of funding markets may also lead to currency depreciations. In emerging markets (i.e. Mexico and Turkey), for instance, the depreciation of local currencies during the crisis phase, resulted in huge losses of currency-related derivative positions of corporates (see Jara et al., 2009). As suggested in BIS (2010), this led to even a higher demand for usd, further depreciating the local currencies and exacerbating the demand/supply conditions. To measure the impact of currency risk on deviations, we use two factors: (i) the Citi Implied Volatility USD pair index; (ii) the Citi Implied Volatility Emerging Markets index. We label the former as CIVIUS, and the latter as CIVIEM. 19 They generate an Uncertainty-DiB factor by de-trending the first principal component of the differentials in the future earning-forecasts of several US firms. 20 As of May 2005, the Emerging Market MSCI index consists of twenty-six Emerging Market indices: Argentina, Brazil, Chile, Colombia, Mexico, Peru, Venezuela, China, India, Indonesia, Korea, Malaysia, Pakistan, Philippines, Russia, Taiwan, Thailand, Egypt, Israel, Jordan, Morocco, Czech Republic, Hungary, Poland, Turkey and South Africa. 21 The index includes 125 companies that have ratings BBB and higher in North America. 22 The index consists of Argentina, Brazil, Colombia, Mexico, Panama, Peru, Venezuela, Hungary, Russia, Turkey, Ukraine, South Africa, Indonesia, Malaysia and Philippines.
Local Factors
Risk Reversal : Brunnermeir and Perdersen (2008) measure the expected currency devaluation associated with given currency with the the price of risk reversal which is a long position in an out-of-the money call option combined with a short position of an equally out-of-the-money put (slope of the implied volatility smile). Risk reversal can also be regarded as the combined effects of expected skewness and a skewness risk premium in that currency. It should be noted that the option-implied skewness derived from risk-reversals is immune to peso problems, while the realized skewness measure is not. Carr and Wu (2007) also point out the time variant risk premium in risk reversals. To measure the impact of country-specific currency risk premium, we control for the changes in the 1-month risk reversal of 25 delta, denoting it as RR. 
Methodology
The short-term deviations from covered interest rate parity condition is based on equation (2) and long-term deviations are captured via cross currency basis swap spreads, or in other words, the basis. While the former is calculated via the interest rate parity condition, the latter is taken directly from the market.
Pooled Analysis
We use the extended framework of Garleanu and Pedersen (2010) and Coffey et al. (2009) to explain the potential determinants of CIRP by including local, macro and sentiment risk factors, as defined in Section 5. This analysis can also be seen as an extended application of the conceptual setting of Vayanos and Vila (2009). We conduct a fixed-effect panel regression analysis for each corresponding currency vis-a-vis dollar. The independent variables are the first-differenced series of the factors discussed in Section 5. The dependent variable is the CIRP deviations minus the corresponding bid-ask spreads. We keep separate pools for emerging and developed markets and short-and long-term deviations in each subsample, and run the following pools:
where Z m j,t is the vector of net CIRP deviations in each currency j. Each regressor in equation (7) . In order to capture the mean-reverting property, we also include the first lagged variables. The first-difference operator is defined as δ. In the fixed effects model, we assume that the intercepts (α j ) capture the country-specific factors inherent in the deviations. When the number of individuals are greater than time periods, the fixed-effects model suffers from coefficient biases (see Nickell, 1981) . However, the number of our individual variables do not exceed the time length, and hence, our data does not suffer from this drawback.
PCA Analysis
In order to give a precise answer as to whether the cross-sectional deviations move together under a systemic or a regional market bias, we conduct principal component analysis on the covariance matrix, which is constructed from the residuals of the pool regressions. The main idea is to investigate the nature of the unexplained variation in the CIRP dynamics. As Scherer and Avellaneda (2002) state, PCA is useful in "reducing the dimension"by concentrating on few important factors that represent the main sources of variation in the market, where the first component often refers to systemic shocks, and the second component to regional shocks. In order to decide the number of eigenvectors on which we should attach significance, and hence to work with limited number of components, we also run a sphericity test as proposed by Fluery (1988, Ch. 2). The sphericity analysis reveals that there are two significant principal components. In PCA analyses, depending on the weight of the corresponding eigenvalues, it is often the case that the first principal component represents a globally-driven market shock, while the second represents a regional-driven risk. This analysis has the same insight as Longstaff et al. (2008) in their investigation of the sovereign CDS contracts.
Contagion Analysis
Financial institutions facilitate short and long term funds, depending on their strategic decisions and the overall macroeconomic environment. The relation between the short-and long-term financing becomes important in the sense that there may exist a sequential pattern in the volatility spillover in both markets, and financial institutions may have to take positions, accordingly. For instance, Taylor (1989) argue that long term arbitrage opportunities tend to follow short term arbitrage opportunities, especially during turbulent times.
We analyze three channels of contagion between short-and long-term CIRP deviations. First, we investigate the correlated information channel via the price discovery process. In doing so, we observe whether a shock to short-term signals any relevant information to long-term. In case there is price discovery from short-to long-term, immediate effects should arise in the long-term. We test price discovery via Hasbrouck (1995) , which requires a cointegration relation between two non-stationary variables. Nonetheless, we observe that short-and long-term deviations are not cointegrated during the sample period, implying that the contagion is not from a correlated-information channel. As a second channel of contagion, we investigate the volatility transmission between short-and long-term deviations. As discussed in Forbes and Rigobon (2002) , estimating correlation via rolling windows tends to be biased during crisis periods, as conditional heteroskedasticity is not directly modeled. We therefore run a bivariate Garch model with BEKK (1,1) parameterizations based on Engle and Kroner (1995) 24 on short-and long-term CIRP deviations, to test whether there is volatility spillover between the two. More formally, the bivariate GARCH model can be written as
where ∆r t is the bivariate vector of the returns of SD and LD, and F t−1 represents the information up to time t − 1. The corresponding shocks are denoted as ǫ t ∼ N(0, Σ t ), where N is the bivariate normal distribution and Σ is the conditional covariance matrix. Using BEKK (1,1), this matrix can be modeled as follows:
where C is constant, A is the ARCH coefficient matrix and G is the GARCH coefficient matrix. The quadratic nature of the equation ensures that Σ is positive-definite. Volatility is transmitted through price changes (i.e an increase in the volatility of the variance of returns) and noise (i.e an increase in the volatility of the variance of the forecast error). The volatility spillover channel helps us to understand whether shocks in the short-term influence the willingness of participants to undertake risk in the long-term. As a third channel, the nature of the correlations between the corresponding deviations is also important to understand the level of contagion in the given markets. Bollerslev (1990) suggested constant conditional correlations model, which restricts the correlation between two asset returns to be constant over time. Nevertheless, in the light of the rejection of constant correlation (Bera and Kim, 2002) , Engle (2002) proposed the Garch-DCC Model, which includes the dynamic conditional correlation factor. Based on Engle's idea, we use the Garch-DCC model to recap the gains of assessing the correlations between the short and long term funding behaviors.
Results
In Section 4, we see that CIRP dislocations are time-variant and state-dependent. In the pre-crisis, both short-and long-term dislocations fluctuate around zero. But they become large, volatile and highly persistent during the crisis, suggesting that no-arbitrage theory fails empirically. S. Treasury, helped FX swap markets to recover, enabling deviations to converge back to initial levels? It is a difficult issue in asset pricing models to resolve whether convergence to equilibrium should be related to improvements in economic fundamentals or interventions of governments, or both. We will investigate these issues empirically.
Pooled Regression Results
We define our explanatory variables as Local, Regional and Global Risk factors, each consisting of relevant sub-categories. Tables 4-7 display the results. In general, we find evidence that the economic relevance of each risk factor differs for each period (i.e. pre-crisis, crisis or post-crisis) and for each swap term (i.e. shortor long-term) and for each country group (emerging vs. developed countries). Notably, the relevance of the lagged deviations depends entirely on the period and the country group, invalidating the mean-reverting property as a general norm. For short-term disequilibrium in developed countries, for example, the slope coefficient of the lagged deviation is negative (i.e. -0.43 bps) and statistically significant only for the pre-crisis period; whereas for the long-term disequilibrium, negative significance is observed for both pre-crisis and crisis phases (i.e. the slope coefficients being -0.31 bps and -0.32 bps for the subsequent periods, respectively). This finding suggests that the long-term disruptions in developed countries tend to maintain their mean-reverting property during the market turmoil. In emerging countries, however, the lagged deviations in short-term are statistically significant for both pre-crisis and post-crisis periods, having slope coefficients of -0.51 bps and -0.19 bps, respectively. For the long-term, the lagged slope coefficient in emerging countries is always statistically and economically relevant during each subsample period, retaining their negative signs. We also find that the term of the swap agreements play an important role: short-and long-term swaps have different sensitivities to different risk factors. In general, the short-term deviations are more sensitive to risk factors with higher R 2 values. This suggests that we may need to identify other risk proxies to represent the dynamics at the long-end of the swap markets.
Pre-Crisis Period:
Developed Countries Table 4 reveals that the adjusted-R 2 values are approximately 13% and 9% for short-and long-term, respectively. Interestingly, while none of the risk factors are relevant in the short-term; UNSECURED is found statistically significant for the long-term, having t-stat as -2.39. However, its explanatory power is considerably low, which is indeed expected, given that the no-arbitrage argument holds empirically during this period. Table 6 shows that the adjusted-R 2 values are approximately 37% and 16% for short-and long-term, respectively. The entire explanatpry power in short-term is attrbiuted to the lagged deviation. On the other hand, both the SECURED and UNSECURED are found statistically significant in the long-term disequilibrium, having t-stats of 3.01 and 2.26, respectively. The economic relevance of these proxies, however, is low. Nonetheless, it gives us a valuable hint. Recalling that the basis is never zero during this period, we can claim that the counterparty risk in normal conditions is partly affected by the funding constraints in the market. Other global risk factors are found economically and statistically insignificant during this period.
Emerging Countries
Crisis Period:
Developed Countries
The picture changes completely during the crisis period, which coincides with the greatest deviations.
As Table 4 shows, the model explains 39% and 41% of the total variation for short-and long-term deviations, respectively. For the short-term, the explanatory power revolves mostly around the risk fac- When the crisis period is further divided into liquidity and credit phases, we find interesting results. Table 5 displays that during the liquidity crisis (9 August 2007 -29 August 2008), the adjusted-R 2 are 21% and 26% for the short-and long-term deviations, respectively. This suggests that the explanatory power of the model is by far stronger than the pre-crisis period, but much weaker than the credit crisis period, when the adjusted-R 2 jump up to 50% and 45% for the short-and long-term deviations, respectively. Hence, the credit phase is the time when the given risk proxies are most relevant. For the short-term, the Closed-End Fund Discount becomes significant only after the collapse of Lehman Brothers, implying that the liquidity phase is statistically unaffected by market's sentimental biases, while the credit phase is greatly driven by it. Other risk factors, such as 3-month SECURED, Repo Specialness and Currency Market Risk proxies match in terms of economic relevance in both periods. Furthermore, the Macro-activity risk is significant only during the liquidity crisis. This suggests that shocks to economic fundamentals also play a relevant role in the short-term disequilibrium. For the longterm, the UNSECURED, CLOSED-END, VIX and CIVIUS become relevant only during the credit phase with t-stats of 3.38, -2.75, -2.56 and 3.38, respectively. This finding suggests that the long-end of the swap market during the liquidity phase is mainly unaffected by sentiment biases and investor's appetite for extreme exposures in US stock markets. However, the impact of Commercial Paper Issuances (CP) on long-term deviations is well captured during the liquidity crisis with a t-stat of -2.15. This finding is interesting. The commercial papers of financial institutions, initially regarded as low-risk collaterals, became increasingly difficult to sell in the money markets, following the collapse of Bearn Stearn's two hedge fund on 31 July 2007. In the end, the Federal Reserve had to intervene by directly purchasing commercial papers from the financial markets, supporting why CP might be statistically relevant in our model. In addition, the Subjective Uncertainty also has explanatory power during the liquidity phase with a t-stat of -2.90, indicating to the impact of heterogeneous perceptions at the long-end of the market.
Emerging Countries
For emerging markets, the picture also changes completely during the crisis period. As shown in Table   6 , the model explains around 26% and 23% of the total variation for short-and long-term deviations, respectively. The first point that strikes the eyes is that the adjusted-R 2 are considerably lower than those in developed countries. This is in indication of how the majority of the given risk proxies are weakly relevant for the swap markets of emerging economies. The majority of the impact for the short-term is attributed to Market Currency Risk (CIVIEM) factor with a t-stat of 2. South Africa) and Foreign Reserves (Turkey) are found highly and statistically significant in the longterm. Along with our short-term findings, this suggests that, unlike developed economies, emerging economies are highly sensitive to local risk factors. Moreover, our analysis also reveals that both the short-and long-end of the swap markets are statistically unaffected by Closed-End Fund Discounts, Subjective Uncertainty, Global Liquidity Factor and Equity Risk Premium. This is also in indication of how the given risk proxies are mostly irrelevant for emerging markets. Therefore, our findings give a clear evidence that the CIRP disequilibrium dynamics of emerging markets are driven by different risk factors compared to developed economies.
When the crisis period is further divided into liquidity and credit phases, the picture is completely different than the developed economies. For the credit crisis, however, these values are 33% and 28%, respectively. This is important, because the explanatory power of the model is stronger in the credit phase than it is in the liquidity phase. For the short-term (during liquidity crisis), the majority of the impact is attributed to Term Premia with a t-stat of 2.02, the significance of which translates into how sensitive emerging economies are to US Treasury policies. More importantly, however, we see that the Risk Reversal (RR) in Turkey is also highly and statistically relevant as a country-specific factor with a t-stat of 2.84. In the long-term (during the liquidity phase) the SECURED funding also gains some explanatory power along with the Term Premia. Similar to short-term, the Risk Reversal (RR) in Mexico for long-term deviations is also highly and statistically relevant as a local risk factor with a t-stat of 2.12. None of the other risk proxies are economically relevant. The impacts of Perceived Tail Event Risk, Unsecured funding, Macroactivity risk and Market Currency Risks are pronounced only during the crisis period for the short-term disequilibrium, having t-stats of 2.50, 2.21, -2.10 and 2.35, respectively. This finding gives evidence that arbitrageurs are subject to funding constraints and extreme market perceptions in US stock markets as well as to shocks to economic fundamentals. This finding is also in accordance with Gromb and Vayanos (2010) in the sense that there is an evidence of market segmentation between the short and long-terms. It is also interesting to observe the interplay between the funding constraints in emerging and developed economies. While developed economies are affected by SECURED funding costs, emerging economies are affected by UNSECURED funding costs. In this context, Greenspan (2008) discusses the LIBOR/OIS spread as a proxy for the probability of bank insolvency and extra capital needs; and points out to the dramatic rise of this spread during the recent credit crisis. Our results show that this dramatic increase was a relevant issue in emerging economies, and not so much in developed economies. For the long-term, the main globally relevant factors are Perceived Tail Event Risk, Term Premia and Market Currency Risk, having t-stats of -2.00, -3.10 and 2.78, respectively. Therefore, the discussions we give above also apply here. Similar to short-term, the Risk Reversal (Mexico and South Africa) and Foreign Reserves (Turkey) are found statistically and economically relevant. This finding also validates the significant impact of local factors in emerging economies. Nevertheless, it is important to note that the majority of the impact comes from the lagged long-term deviations, meaning that the explanatory power of the given risk factors is relatively low. This finding is in indication of the importance of identifying new additional risk factors for emerging swap markets.
3. Post-Crisis Period:
Developed Countries
As Table 4 displays, the adjusted-R 2 values in the post-crisis period drop considerably compared to the market turmoil (i.e. 18% for short-term, 12% for long-term). The impact of Global Sentiment and Global Macro risks vanishes completely. The majority of contribution is now attributed to Global
Funding factors, namely UNSECURED and CP. To be more precise, the CP is relevant in short-term, and marginally more so in the long-term markets, having t-stats of 3.06 and 3.76, respectively. The UNSECURED, however, loses its economic impact in the long-term, leaving it to the Equity Risk Premium. In general, our findings suggest that the funding constraints in European markets continue to prevent short-term arbitrage opportunities. This argument will be further supported by the following BEKK results, where one-way dynamic spillover effect is still an issue in the post-crisis phase.
Emerging Countries
A slightly different pattern is observed in emerging markets. Table 6 suggests that for the short-term, the adjusted-R 2 drops considerably to 9%, having the lagged variable as the only significant variable.
None of the other risk proxies are relevant. On the other hand, the adjusted-R 2 for the long-term is 16%. The contribution is mostly due to UNSECURED funding and Market Currency Risk factors with t-stats of 4.01 and -2.56, respectively. This also implies that the tightness in intrabank lending is still a financial constraint in arbitrage opportunities in emerging economies. Most importantly, the low level of adjusted-R 2 once again brings the necessity of identifying new risk proxies for these emerging swap markets. Table 8 shows the PCA results conducted on the residuals of pool regressions. In developed countries, we observe that the first principal component for long-term disequilibrium explains 42%, 58% and 55% of the total unexplained variation during the pre-crisis, crisis and post-crisis phases, respectively. Similarly, the short-term equivalents are 50%, 82% and 46% for each phase, respectively. Not only does this finding support our initial argument that short-term markets are relatively more sensitive than their long-term equivalents; but it also reveals that the impact of a systemic shock is consistently and mostly pronounced during the market turmoil.
PCA Results
Nonetheless, a different picture is observed in emerging markets. The first principal component for long-term disequilibrium explains 43%, 36% and 48% of the total unexplained variation during the pre-crisis, crisis and post-crisis phases, respectively. Likewise, the short-term equivalents are only 53%, 38% and 43% for each phase, respectively. The second principal components consistently range between 30% to 35% for each swap term and subsample period, almost equally weighted with the first principal components. This suports our initial finding: emerging swap markets, when compared to their developed equivalents, are considerably less sensitive to unexplained global shocks, and more sensitive to regional anomalies. This is an important finding as it directs us in identifying more applicable risk proxies (country-specific) for the emerging economies.
Contagion Results
During the market turmoil, US financial institutions proved to be highly reluctant in lending dollars to non-US financial institutions, because of two major reasons. First, US institutions were cautious against the amplified counterparty risk in the uncollateralized interbank markets. Second, US institutions were facing financial difficulties, and thus were in need to preserve precautionary liquid funds. The self-evident outcome was the severe dollar-funding shortage in the non-US financial institutions that soon attempted to raise dollars by first participating in short-term FX swaps, and later in longer-term cross-currency swaps (see Baba, 2009 ).
Baba and Packer (2008) find evidence that the money market turmoil has spilled over to FX swap markets amid a heightened counterparty risk. Table 9 gives the summary of the volatility spillovers in developed and emerging countries' swap markets. There are two major findings: First, there were no signs of dynamic spillovers in the pre-crisis, while a severe case of dynamic spillover became evident during the market turmoil, both in developed and emerging markets. This proves the strong interlink between funding markets during times of distress. The direction of the volatility spillover in developed markets were from short-to long-term without exception, validating the observation that European financial institutions were in an urgent demand of usd firstly in short-term, and later in long-term swap markets (see Baba, 2009 ). On the other hand, emerging markets consistently displayed a two-way spillover feature during this period. The bi-causality in emerging swap markets is a difficult issue to resolve, and at this point, it can only be linked to the bilateral shifts of funding needs. More importantly, it reveals that the general pattern (observed in developed markets) is not a general norm around the globe. Second, the impact of volatility spillover (in developed markets) persists even during the post-crisis (implying that the memory of turmoil is still retained), but such impact is not observed in emerging markets. This might be partly related to the extensive accumulation of usd reserves in emerging economies, and to the difference in the motivation behind the use of derivatives. According to Obstfeld et al. (2009) , the dollar-based swap agreements with the emerging markets were mainly symbolic, because adequate amounts of foreign reserves were already being held in these countries, and thus the corresponding swap lines could only be interpreted as signals.
In Table 9 , only the significant conditional correlation values (between short-and long-term deviations) are listed. Results suggest that the correlations become significant in developed markets during the crisis period, and tends to persist still in Japan and Euro Zone even after the market distress, validating the previous BEKK findings. On the other hand, there is little or no evidence of any sign of dynamic correlation in the emerging markets in any of the given subsample periods. One exception is Mexico, where the corresponding co-movements become weakly significant during the crisis period, but still vanishes thereafter. These findings shed light to an interesting phenomenon. The short-and long-term funding characteristics maintain similar dynamics in developed markets, meaning that if a problem occurs in the short-term, it is likely to occur in the long-term as well. This may be a clue as to why the volatility spillovers continue even after the crisis period. In emerging markets, however, the short-and long-term funding characteristics tend to be relatively more segmented from one another.
Furthermore, based on the correlated-information channel (Longstaff, 2010), we also tested whether there exists any price discovery relation among the short-and long-term CIRP deviations. One way of testing it is via Hasbrouck (1995) , which requires a cointegration relation between two non-stationary variables. Nevertheless, our findings show that short-and long-term deviations are not cointegrated during the sample period, implying that the contagion is not from a correlated-information channel.
25 25 Results are available from authors upon request.
Government Policy Implications
The empirical analyses lead to the important discussion of the impact of public policies carried out during the market distress. The question is: Were these policy responses really effective? The effectiveness of policy measures is often difficult to argue, not only because of the technical limits of coming up with an efficient policy quantification, but also because of the simultaneous nature of the policy programs. During 2007-2009, the Federal Reserve intervened with a variety of different ambitious programs, some launched at different periods of crisis, aiming different market risk exposures. The timing of the interventions could be investigated under two main categories; liquidity phase and credit phase. Before moving on to discussing the timing and effects of the policy programs, however, it is important to emphasize again that both short-and long-term deviations rise monotonically from liquidity to credit crisis periods, reaching their maximum levels starting from the Lehman collapse in September 2008.
1. Liquidity Crisis: The first major step addressing the illiquidity problem in financial markets was the Federal Reserve's Term Auction Facility (TAF) program initiated on 12 December 2007, which encouraged depository institutions to access term funds through competitive auctions with a variety of collaterals.
The main goal was to facilitate an easy source of liquidity via the central bank. With the growing concern over liquidity, however, the Federal Reserve later attacked the funding market tightness (i.e. unsecured and secured) by introducing Term Securities Lending Facility (TSLF). Our findings suggest, however, that CIRP deviations show no evidence of converging to their equilibrium values after the initiation of these measures. Heuristically, this implies that policy actions at this time were mostly ineffective.
Supporting our empirical observation, Taylor and Williams (2009) find no evidence for the success of TAF in reducing the LIBOR-OIS spreads in the unsecured markets. 
Conclusion
We contribute to the existing literature by introducing a comparative analysis of the dynamics of LOP violations in developed and emerging economies, during the recent crisis period. By focusing on three developed and three emerging market currencies, we investigate the potential determinants of both short-and long-term CIRP deviations, also discussing the interlink between the two funding markets via volatility spillover tests.
The no-arbitrage condition must enforce the CIRP deviations to be zero. While this is the case during the pre-crisis periods, it is severely disrupted in the crisis period, especially during the credit turmoil, when deviations are large, volatile and highly persistent. 29 In other words, CIRP equilibrium is not an empirical norm, 29 During this phase, there is also a considerable demand for usd liquidity from the majority of economies.
but is time-varying and state-dependent. This implies that arbitrageurs are subject to certain constraints that prevent them from taking the corresponding positions and providing liquidity to the markets.
We ask the crucial question of whether arbitrageurs are constrained by the same risk factors across different economies. We find that the answer is no; an unexploited arbitrage, though same in structure, may be driven by different risk factors in different economies, even during periods of financial distress, when the impact of risk factors are expected to be more contagious across different markets. Hence, the significance of the risk factors depend on the sample period (i.e. pre-crisis, crisis, post-crisis), swap terms (i.e. short-vs. long-term) and the type of economy (i.e. developed vs. emerging). The impacts are often greater for the short-term swap agreements. By assessing the characteristics of deviations, we come up with local, regional and global factors. While the model for the crisis period explains between 39% to 41% of total variation in developed countries (for short-and long-term, respectively), these values only range between 23% to 26% in emerging countries. This is in indication of the fact that the given risk factors are comparably less relevant in emerging swap economies. Furthermore, developed swap markets are mainly sensitive to Global Funding, Closed-End Fund Discounts and Currency Market Risk factors during the credit phase. Emerging swap markets, on the other hand, are mostly driven by Perceived Tail Event Risk, Term Premia and the given country-specific risks, i.e. Risk Reversals and Foreign Reserves. Our PCA analysis also verifies that developed swap markets are more sensitive to global systemic shocks, while emerging swap markets are more sensitive to regional biases. This suggests that arbitrageurs are affected by different market constraints in different economies. This result also implies that we may need to reconsider how we identify our risk proxies for emerging countries, especially during financial distresses. For pre-and post-crisis phases, the impact of the given risk factors are often negligible in both developed and emerging swap markets, coinciding with the fact that LOP more or less holds during these periods.
Our second main finding is concerned with the volatility spillover between the short-and long-term markets.
Our findings give evidence that the information transmission also varies to a certain extent in developed and emerging swap markets. First of all, there exists no volatility spillover in both economies before the outbreak of the financial distress. During the crisis phase, however, developed markets consistently display a oneway spillover movement (from short-to long-term funding), but emerging markets tend to display two-way movements. This implies that the general argument in support of the "short-to long-term transmission"is not necessarily the norm across markets. More importantly, while the spillover effects tend to persist in developed countries even during the post-crisis period, no such transmission is observed in emerging countries.
This suggests that the memory of funding constraints is retained in developed swap markets, but not in their emerging equivalents. This also indicates to a certain segmentation among developed and emerging economies.
Our findings also suggest that there exists a dynamic correlation between short-and long-term deviations, but no correlated-information channel (i.e. price discovery) between these corresponding deviations.
Finally, our findings support the argument that the compression of CIRP deviations coincides with the stress test announcements. This implies that FED's actions undertaken during the liquidity phase were mainly ineffective, and that the later interventions were more successful in relieving the market frictions. The underlying message here is that funding markets are responsive to governmental programs that target the "uncertainty"risk in financial markets. Clearly, this has important welfare and policy implications for further research. Comparative Analysis of ABS Deviations and Bid-Ask Spreads Figure 1 * The upper row represents the differential between the absolute short-and long-term CIRP deviations and the bid-ask spreads corresponding to Turkey. The lower row represents the differential between the absolute short-and long-term CIRP deviations and the bid-ask spreads corresponding to Euro Zone. The graphs are divided into pre-crisis, crisis and post-crisis periods. The short-and long-term values are both given in bps.
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